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Abstract 
The purpose of this MBA Project is to discuss the use of the coordinative 
acquisition tool, which supports Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
(DAPA) recommendations calling for more streamlined acquisition architecture.  
Specifically, we conduct an analysis of the coordinative acquisition strategy as 
presented by Dr. Joseph P. Avery in his January 2006 presentation entitled, 
“Coordinative Acquisition Strategies; Hyperswift Response to the Warfighter” as an 
acquisition tool used outside of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  We 
compare this method to DoD Directive 5000.1, DAPA, and other acquisition policies 
calling for acquisition cycle-time reduction and for a more simplified acquisition 
architecture.  We also conduct a case study on the Rapid Identification Friend or Foe 
(RIFF) test kit prototype and develop lessons learned as it relates to DoD-wide 
implementation of coordinative acquisition as a viable streamlined acquisition tool for 
rapid acquisition of immature technologies necessary for warfighter support.  We 
also discuss interviews with Government and industry representatives at all levels in 
order to better explore legal and ethical considerations of coordinative acquisition.  
Feedback from these interviews provides useful insight into industry’s actual 
willingness to accept this form of acquisition for future projects within the DoD. 
Keywords: Coordinative acquisition, acquisition reform, acquisition 
architecture, streamlined acquisition, Gunshot-residue (GSR) Testing, Rapid 
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Executive Summary 
Typically, the government follows formal contract procedures laid out in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) for solicitation, development, testing, and 
procurement of new products and technologies.  There is, however, an alternative 
that falls outside FAR procedures.  This alternative uses close coordination of critical 
acquisition activities to support real-world warfighter requirements without a 
formalized government requirement, budget, personnel, or a contract.  Contractors 
bear all research, development, and production costs, while the government agrees 
to “market” the final product to units who have a bona fide need throughout the DoD 
for this technology/item.  This alternative is called Coordinative Acquisition (CA) 
and is a cooperative and simplified administrative and management process using a 
Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate the accelerated development and 
fielding of a product by the contractor without the constraints of the FAR. 
CA utilizes the vendors' existing commercial product management system to 
provide the required capability.  Rather than rely on government-unique processes 
and controls to regulate the development process, the market forces of the free 
commercial marketplace are relied upon.  CA utilizes neither a contract nor 
appropriate funds and, therefore, does not fall under FAR guidelines.  Even though 
the FAR does not directly apply to CA, the objectives of full and open competition, 
fair treatment of suppliers, and business ethics are all important parts of the CA 
process.   
CA, like any acquisition methodology, has positive and negative 
considerations.  Proper ethical conduct, legal consideration, and sound business 
judgment are all core competencies required for successful implementation of CA.  If 
not conducted appropriately, CA may lead to the appearance of improprieties in 
government acquisition.  CA should be considered simply another acquisition tool 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - xii- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
compelling needs in direct support of the warfighter.  CA is a successful, viable 
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I. Introduction 
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 36 next-generation 
weapon systems are over budget by $23 billion and over schedule by at least one 
year for some programs and as much as four years for others (Wayne, 2006, July 
11).  The security environment facing the United States and her allies today requires 
radical changes to our current acquisition architecture and new ways to develop, 
test, produce, and field urgently needed products to support our warfighters in the 
Global War on Terrorism—all within constrained budgets.  Acting Secretary of 
Defense Gordon England mandated in his 7 June 2005 memo, “we must simplify 
and coordinate all acquisition activities.”  Coordinative acquisition (CA) is one such 
approach which has been used to provide streamlined acquisition to our nation’s 
warfighters—under the pretext that Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) processes 
do not apply since no contracts or appropriated funds are used, nor are services or 
products purchased or procured.   
A. Methodology 
The methodology of this project is both to analyze the use of the CA approach 
(which has been used since 2003 by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 
as an “outside-the-FAR” tool for rapidly acquisitioning products in direct support of 
warfighters in the field) and to compare this approach to Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) recommendations calling for more streamlined 
acquisition architecture.  We explore the uses and viability of coordination 
acquisition through several evaluation lenses, including a literary review for 
relevance to existing acquisition policy, questionnaires, and interviews for public- 
and private-sector impressions and expertise, other research, and our personal 
experiences.  Important research questions to answer include how this approach is 
viewed by government and industry, the legal and ethical considerations as it relates 
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for possible policy development for use and, finally, the circumstances under which 
industry will be willing to accept this form of acquisition for future DoD projects.    
B. Background 
In June 2005, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed 
an assessment of the DoD acquisition system due to historical cost and schedule 
overruns and growing discontent from Congress.  As a result of this memo, the 
DAPA task force was established and led by Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish 
(USAF, Retired) to study and make recommendations on defense acquisition system 
reform (including review of the FAR/DFAR and previous acquisition reform studies) 
in order to streamline the current DoD acquisition architecture.  In support of DAPA 
recommendations for more flexible, responsive, innovative, and streamlined 
acquisition strategies within the DoD-acquisition framework, the DTRA is using 
strategies for rapid acquisition of products in direct support of the warfighter in Iraq.  
While DTRA has used similar approaches for rapid acquisition efforts in the past 
(i.e., 2001: 5,000 pound GBU-28 Bunker Buster from concept to production in 129 
days), the main focus for coordinative acquisition in this project is a case study in 
which DTRA coordinated with industry on the development of existing law-
enforcement technology.  This technology was miniaturized, simplified, hardened, 
and rapidly fielded as the Rapid Identification Friend or Foe (RIFF) detection unit in 
Iraq within 49 days (outside of FAR/DFAR oversight) by coordinating the efforts to 
two different companies (Law Enforcement Technologies, Inc., and Sirchie Finger 
Print Laboratories, Inc.).  According to DTRA, no contracts, formalized requirements, 
budgets, or personnel were used in the development, production, and fielding of the 
RIFF units, thereby alleviating the requirement to adhere to Federal/DoD acquisition 
policy (i.e., FAR/DFAR).  In February 2006, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
was presented with the unique opportunity from the U.S. Marine Corps Systems 
Command’s PM Infantry Combat Equipment, (Quantico, VA) in coordination with the 
NPS Acquisition Research Program, to study the CA approach as a viable DoD 
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C. Problem Identification 
According to Dr. Joseph P. Avery in his January 2006 presentation entitled, 
“Coordinative Acquisition Strategies; Hyperswift Response to the Warfighter,” CA is 
compliant with DoD Directive 5000.1 and falls outside of the FAR/DFARS process, 
since it does not fit the definition of a FAR acquisition.  In order to take a closer look 
at CA and begin to understand legal statutory and ethical considerations surrounding 
both its use and its appropriateness for DoD-wide implementation, we must 
collaborate with government and industry representatives.  Specifically, it is 
important to understand: 1) how the RIFF test kit case and the overall CA approach 
supports acquisition reform, and 2) the results and lessons learned from this case 
study.  It is also imperative to understand which technologies are most applicable for 
this type of acquisition approach and the circumstances under which industry would 
be willing to participate in funding the development of immature variations into 
mature technologies up front, without guarantees from the government on future 
orders.   
D. Overview of Report 
This project presents five distinct chapters which address the purpose of this 
report, namely, implementing coordinative acquisition as a viable streamlined 
acquisition process in the DoD, and answer the main question as to whether or not 
contractors will choose to participate.   
1. Chapter I—Introduction 
This introductory chapter establishes the concept of coordinative acquisition, 
discusses the current acquisition environment, and provides a broad background of 
DoD acquisition reform efforts.  A problem identification section expounds the 
concept of coordinative acquisition as originally presented by the DTRA.  Finally, 
each of the project’s five chapters presents an overview to introduce the reader to 
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2. Chapter II—Literature Review 
The second chapter discusses current and historical statutory requirements, 
policy, and guidance as they relate to acquisition procedures and the coordinative 
acquisition approach.  It is through this literature review that we establish a basic 
level of understanding of the acquisition framework today within the context of 
streamlined acquisition reform initiatives.  Finally, this chapter also attempts to 
improve the readers’ awareness of currently documented policies and procedures as 
laid out in the DoD 5000 series, the FAR, the DFAR and the Defense Grant and 
Agreement Regulatory Systems.   
3. Chapter III—Rapid Identification Friend or Foe Test Kit Case 
Study 
Chapter III analyzes the development and deployment of the Rapid 
Identification Friend or Foe (RIFF) test kit as a coordinative acquisition case study 
that was the first product developed using this approach in 2003.  We explore the 
history of gunshot-residue testing and the development of the Instant Shooter 
Identification technology, which is the predecessor to the RIFF test kit.  A 
comprehensive timeline presents an encompassing synopsis of the entire acquisition 
spectrum from requirements determination to deployment in the field supporting 
RIFF test kit’s primary customer, the warfighters.  Finally, results and lessons 
learned are presented from this case study, which will be drawn upon in Chapter IV.  
4. Chapter IV—Findings and Recommendations 
Chapter IV provides findings and recommendations for coordinative 
acquisition use based upon several sources—including our literature review drawn 
from Chapter II, the case study from Chapter III, questionnaires, interviews, other 
research, and our own collective personal experiences.  Specifically, we address the 
actual CA concept using an in-depth framework which explains all of the steps in the 
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scenarios such as the RIFF test case used in Chapter III.  We also discuss CA’s 
relationship to existing acquisition policies and provide our findings on industry and 
government attitudes toward CA, including ways to encourage contractors to use CA 
more in the future.  Also included in this chapter are results from questionnaires 
taken by government and industry professionals, which contribute to understanding 
the advantages and concerns relating to CA use from legal, ethical, and sound 
business standpoints.  Finally, we provide recommendations on possible DoD policy 
and provide a way ahead for government use in the future.   
5. Chapter V—Conclusion 
In our final chapter, we draw in all concepts presented in the previous four 
chapters and summarize the project as a whole.  Lastly, we acknowledge that our 
project is limited in scope and present three areas relevant to CA requiring further 
research that may facilitate continued discussion and study of CA.     
E. Summary 
This chapter introduced the concept of CA, discussed the current acquisition 
environment, and provided a broad background of DoD acquisition reform efforts.  A 
problem identification section provided a synopsis of the concept of CA as originally 
presented by the DTRA.  Finally, this chapter presented an overview of each of the 
project’s five chapters in order to introduce the reader to CA project concepts as it 
relates to the broader acquisition framework.  In the next chapter, we provide a 
literature review of the acquisition framework and discuss current and historical 
statutory requirements, policy, and guidance as they relate to acquisition procedures 
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II. Literature Review 
A. Introduction 
Before examining the coordinative acquisition (CA) process as a viable 
acquisition streamlining initiative, it is essential to establish a basic level of 
understanding of the policy, guidance, and Code that form the framework of the 
acquisition process today.  As CA is primarily an alternative method of research and 
development (R&D) and rapid prototyping, this chapter will focus on improving the 
reader’s understanding of the currently documented policies and procedures as laid 
out in the DoD 5000 series, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the DFARS 
(Defense FAR Supplement) and the Defense Grant and Agreement Regulatory 
System (DGARS).  These policies are provided as background for the current 
acquisition process.  How they relate to CA and the differences in the approaches 
will be detailed and discussed further in Chapter IV.  A key focus of this chapter is 
the definition of “acquisition” in each of the various regulations and how CA differs 
from those definitions.  In addition, this chapter explores a review of recent reform 
initiatives with particular emphasis on the most recent report from the Defense 
Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project.   
To begin with, it is necessary to define the activities that fall under the purview 
of research and development.  The DGARS (§ 32.2) defines research and 
development as:   
All research activities, both basic and applied, and all development 
activities that are supported at universities, colleges, and other non-
profit institutions.  Research (emphasis added) is defined as a 
systematic study directed toward fuller scientific knowledge or 
understanding of the subject studied.  Development (emphasis added) 
is the systematic use of knowledge and understanding gained from 
research directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, 
systems, or methods, including design and development of prototypes 
and processes.  The term research also includes activities involving 
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utilize the same facilities as other research and development activities 
and where such activities are not included in the instruction function.       
B. Current Acquisition Procedures 
1. DoD 5000 Series 
DoD Directive 5000.1 provides management principles and mandatory 
policies and procedures for managing all acquisition programs.  Per DoDD 5000.1, 
an acquisition program is a directed, funded effort that provides a new, improved, or 
continuing materiel, weapon or information system or service capability in response 
to an approved need (Department of Defense, 2003a, May 12, p. 2).  The Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS) guides the investment strategy of the DoD and serves the 
primary policy objective to deliver quality products that satisfy user needs with 
measurable improvements at the right time and at a fair and reasonable price.  The 
DAS is currently governed by 34 overarching policies.  Outlined below is a synopsis 
of several key policies that are most directly applicable to CA in respect to research, 
development, and acquisition reform efforts: 
a. Flexibility:  Milestone Decision Authorities (MDAs) and Program 
Managers (PMs) shall adapt each program strategy and 
oversight as needed to best suit the conditions of the programs, 
while maintaining compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations. (Department of Defense, 2003a, May 12, p. 3) 
b. Responsiveness:  Evolutionary acquisition strategies are the 
preferred approach for incorporating advanced technologies into 
producible systems using spiral development processes.  
(Department of Defense, 2003a, May 12, p. 3) 
c. Innovation:  Acquisition professionals across the DoD are 
encouraged to adopt innovative practices that foster teamwork 
and reduce cycle-time and cost.  (Department of Defense, 
2003a, May 12, p. 3) 
d. Collaboration:  Teaming using Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) 
shall begin during capability-needs definition.  (Department of 
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e. Competition:  Competition drives innovation, cost control and 
increases quality.  PM shall explore all alternatives in order to 
maintain a competitive environment.  (Department of Defense, 
2003a, May 12, Enclosure 1, p. 6) 
f. Cost Sharing:  Neither the government nor the contractor shall 
assume an unfair portion of program risk or investment.  
Contractors are entitled to a reasonable profit on all DoD 
programs.  In addition, “Contractors shall not be encouraged nor 
required to invest their profit dollars or independent research 
and development funds to subsidize defense research and 
development contracts, except in unusual situations where there 
is a reasonable expectation of a potential commercial 
application” (Department of Defense, 2003a, May 12, Enclosure 
1, p. 7).  
g. Technology Development and Transition:  The Science and 
Technology (S&T) program shall be used to maintain a broad 
base and provide for rapid transition from that base to useful 
military products.  (Department of Defense, 2003a, May 12, 
Enclosure 1, p. 11) 
DoD Instruction 5000.2 describes the operation of the DAS and establishes a 
simplified defense acquisition framework (Figure 2.1) for the transformation of 
mission needs into useable weapon systems for use on all defense technology 
projects and acquisition programs.  The defense acquisition framework detailed 
below is the standard followed for the majority of DoD research and development 
projects and is provided for comparison purposes to the CA process discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
 
Figure 2.1 The Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
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Entry at any stage of the defense acquisition framework is permitted, 
consistent with the entrance criteria for the applicable stage.  The Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) dominates the Concept Refinement (CR) stage.  Emphasis is 
placed on innovation and competition in order to achieve the best possible system 
solution.  The AoA assesses critical technologies considering commercial-off-the-self 
(COTS) solutions in addition to large and small business participation. 
The purpose of the Technology Development (TD) stage is to select the 
appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system while minimizing 
overall technology risk.  TD is an iterative process designed to refine user 
requirements while assessing the feasibility of technologies.  Successful entry into 
this phase does not mean that a new acquisition program has been initiated. 
The final phase typically associated with R&D and prototyping is the System 
Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase.  Entrance into SDD is defined by a 
positive Milestone B decision; it serves to begin a new acquisition program.  SDD 
exemplifies two major efforts:  System Integration and System Demonstration.  
System Integration, as the name implies, integrates sub-systems into a 
comprehensive design—while further reducing system-level risk.  Entrance into 
System Demonstration is defined by successful completion of the Design Readiness 
Review.  System Demonstration focuses on the successful operation of the system 
in accordance with the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).  The Production and 
Deployment stage follows SDD, and is highlighted by either Low-rate Initial or Full-
rate Production and, ultimately, concluded with the Operations and Support stage.  
For the acquisition of mature technology, evolutionary acquisition is the 
preferred DoD strategy (Department of Defense, 2003b, May 12, p. 3).  Capabilities 
are delivered in increments through the use of future capability improvements.  If 
both the desired capability and the end-state requirement are known, a process of 
incremental development is used.  Alternately, if the end-state requirement is not 
known at program initiation, spiral development is the preferred course of action.  
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2. FAR and DFARS  
The Federal Acquisition Regulation System, including agency regulations that 
implement or supplement the FAR, is established to codify uniform policies and 
procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies.  Acquisition is defined in FAR 
2.101(b) as:   
The acquiring by contract with appropriated funds (emphasis added) of 
supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of the 
Federal Government through purchase or lease, whether the supplies 
or services are already in existence or must be created, developed, 
demonstrated, and evaluated.  Acquisition begins at the point when 
agency needs are established and includes the description of 
requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of 
sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract performance, 
contract administration, and those technical and management 
functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by 
contract.  
A contract is defined in FAR 2.101(b) as:   
A mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the 
supplies or services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for 
them.  It includes all types of commitments that obligate the 
government to an expenditure of appropriated funds (emphasis added) 
and that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing.  In addition to 
bilateral instruments, contracts include (but are not limited to) awards 
and notices of awards; job orders or task letters issued under basic 
ordering agreements; letter contracts; orders, such as purchase 
orders, under which the contract becomes effective by written 
acceptance or performance; and bilateral contract modifications.  
Contracts do not include grants and cooperative agreements covered 
by 31 U.S.C.6301, et seq. 
R&D contract procedures are defined in FAR Part 35 and shall only be used if 
the principle purpose is the acquisition of supplies or services for the direct use or 
benefit of the Federal Government.  If the acquisition is intended for any other public 
purpose, grants or cooperative agreements should be used.  Early identification and 
publicizing of R&D needs and requirements is mandatory through the government-
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should be sent to only those sources technically qualified to perform R&D efforts in 
the particular field associated with the requirement.   
Independent Research and Development (IR&D) consists of projects falling 
within the four following areas: 
(1) basic research, 
(2) applied research, 
(3) development, and 
(4) systems and other concept-formulation studies. 
IR&D efforts are funded by private contractors with the future hopes of selling 
the resultant product or services to a particular market segment—whether that is the 
commercial or government sector(s).  CA takes advantage of this existing practice to 
facilitate the development of products with potential use in the Department of 
Defense.  In typical FAR-based contracts, IR&D costs are allowable in accordance 
with FAR 31.205-18.  The important distinction here is that the contractor bears all 
risk and associated development cost internally.  Costs are not recouped until the 
actual product and/or service is sold.  IR&D does not include work performed under 
a grant or in the direct performance of a contract. 
3. Defense Grant and Agreement Regulatory System (DGARS) 
The DGARS was established by DoD Directive 3120.6 and comprises the 
regulations and other policy documents covering the award and administration of 
DoD grants, cooperative agreements, and (where the provisions so indicate) other 
types of non-procurement instruments.  Chapter IV discusses the relationship 
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a. Definitions (from DGARS) 
Grant.  A legal instrument used to enter into a relationship, the principal 
purpose of which is to transfer a thing of value to the recipient to carry out a 
public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United 
States, rather than to acquire property or services for the DoD’s direct benefit 
or use.  Further, it is a relationship in which the DoD and the recipient are 
expected not to be substantially involved when carrying out the activity 
contemplated by the grant. 
Cooperative Agreement.  A legal instrument used to enter into the same kind 
of relationship as a grant, except that substantial involvement between the 
Department of Defense and the recipient is expected when carrying out the 
activity contemplated by the cooperative agreement.  The term does not 
include “cooperative research and development agreements” as defined in 15 
U.S.C. 3710a (reference (f)). 
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA).  Any 
agreement between one or more Federal laboratories and one or more non-
Federal parties under which the government, through its laboratories, 
provides personnel, services, facilities, equipment, intellectual property, or 
other resources with or without reimbursement (but not funds to non-Federal 
parties) and the non-Federal parties provide funds, personnel, services, 
facilities, equipment, intellectual property, or other resources toward the 
conduct of specified research or development efforts which are consistent 
with the missions of the laboratory; except that such term does not include a 
procurement contract or cooperative agreement.  This agreement is also 
known as a Technology Investment Agreement (TIA). 
b. Grants and Cooperative Agreements (10 U.S.C. § 2358) 
The key distinction between procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative 
agreements is that procurement contracts acquire goods and services for the direct 
use or benefit of the government rather than providing assistance or stimulation 
authorized by Federal Statute.   
Grants and cooperative agreements may include basic research, applied 
research, advanced research and development projects that either: 
1)  Relate to weapon systems or other military needs; or 
2)  are of potential interest to the DoD. 
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A TIA can be either a type of cooperative agreement or a type of “assistance 
transaction other than a grant or cooperative agreement,” depending on its patent 
rights provisions.  A TIA is not a cooperative agreement when its patent rights 
provisions are less restrictive than those possible under the Bayh-Dole statute 
(Chapter 18 of Title 35, U.S.C.).  The TIA also may use the authority of 10 U.S.C. § 
2371 to include a recovery of funds provision that requires the recipient, as a 
condition for receiving support under the agreement, to make payments to the 
Department of Defense or other Federal agency.  It is up to the agreement officer’s 
best judgment that the particular research project warrants the less-restrictive patent 
right protection. 
The ultimate goal of a TIA is to help foster the best technologies for future 
defense needs through civil-military integration.  TIAs are designed to: 
1) Reduce barriers to commercial firms’ participation in defense 
research to give the Department of Defense access to the 
broadest possible technology and industrial base.  
2) Promote new relationships among performers in both the 
defense and commercial sectors of that technology and 
industrial base. 
3) Stimulate performers to develop, use, and disseminate 
improved practices.  (Department of Defense, 1998, April 13, § 
37.115, “For what purposes are TIAs used?) 
Specific delegation authority from the Secretary of the Military Department (or 
the Secretary of Defense for Defense Agencies) is required before an organization 
may enter into a TIA. 
d. “Other Transactions” (10 U.S.C. § 2371) 
“Other Transactions” refers to any instrument other than a procurement 
contract, grant, or cooperative agreement for carrying out research projects.  The 
authority's primary purpose is to help broaden the DoD's technological and industrial 
base by allowing development and use of instruments that reduce barriers to 
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done business with the government.  These transactions are to be carried out 
through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).   
1)  Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public 
Law 103-160) temporarily authorized the DARPA to use “other transactions” for 
prototype projects directly related to weapon or weapon systems proposed to be 
acquired or developed by the Department (USD AT&L, 2001, January).   
2)  Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1997 (PL 104-201) 
broadened the authority to include the Military Departments and other designated 
officials and extended its use until September 30, 1999.   
3)  Section 803 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 (Public Law 106-398) 
further extended the authority until September 30, 2004.   
4)  Section 847 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public 
Law 108-136) further extended the authority until September 20, 2008 and increased 
the scope to include the improvement of weapons or weapon systems used by the 
Armed Forces in lieu of just-new prototype items. 
5)  Section 823 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public 
Law 109-163) further modified OTA by adding ethics requirements:   
An agreement entered into under the authority of this section shall be 
treated as a Federal agency procurement for the purposes of section 
27 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act.  (United States 
Code, 2006, 41 U.S.C. 423)   
This modification recognized the importance of procurement ethics in all 
government transactions—whether via contract, grant, agreement, or other 
transaction authority.  Procurement ethics are critical to the CA process, as well, in 
order to ensure all parties are treated fairly. 
C. Streamlined Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
The DoD acquisition system has been undergoing acquisition reform for many 
decades.  Outlined in this section is a brief overview of Modern Acquisition Reform 
(AR), the concerns raised by various government professionals with the pace of AR 
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not a direct recommendation of past AR or the DAPA report, it does implement the 
overarching goal of both by providing a rapid and streamlined alternative approach 
to facilitate development of items for use by the warfighter. 
1. A Brief History 
Modern AR began in the early 1990s in response to recommendations of the 
1985 Packard Commission codified in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  
Detailed in Figure 2.2 is a partial list of additional broad AR programs that further 
drove individual initiatives.  The period from 1994 to 1996 saw the highpoint of AR 
with 46 new acquisition reform initiatives implemented (see Figure 2.3).       
 
Figure 2.2 Samples of Past Acquisition Reforms 
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Figure 2.3 Chronology of Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
(Source:  RAND, 2005, p. 14.) 
The rapid pace of changes brought on by AR catalyzed some concern in 
many acquisition professionals, including the Office of the DoD Inspector General, 
that some AR initiatives could potentially eliminate important procurement 
safeguards.   
Acquisition reform, especially much of what is being proposed in this 
second round, is carrying out a longstanding industrial or supplier 
agenda to curtail or eliminate many of these key safeguards, which 
have been built into the United States procurement process over the 
past 200 years.  I broadly categorize these as disclosure requirements, 
certifications, price-reduction requirements, and audit rights.  Certain of 
these safeguards help ensure cost (fair price) and quality, both of 
which become greater risks as we rely more on commercial products 
and practices.  (Vander Schaaf, 1995, August 3) 
Despite all these changes and attempts at AR throughout the 1990s, the 
current acquisition system is still observed by many members of Congress and the 
DoD Leadership Team with a growing and deep concern.  Many programs continue 
to experience both cost and schedule overruns despite the studies and 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 18- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2. DAPA 
In June 2005, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed 
an assessment of the DoD acquisition system due to historical cost and schedule 
overruns and growing discontent from Congress.  As a result of this memo, the 
DAPA task force was established.  Led by Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish 
(USAF, Retired), this task force was to study and make recommendations on 
defense acquisition system reform (including review of the FAR/DFAR and previous 
acquisition reform studies) in order to streamline the current DoD acquisition 
architecture. 
DAPA conducted an integrated assessment of all aspects of the acquisition 
process through the review of over 1,500 documents, consultation with 107 experts 
and detailed surveys and interviews with over 130 government and industry 
acquisition professionals.  These efforts led to the identification of 42 issue areas 
upon which they focused their attention.  DAPA developed specific integrated 
assessment groups in six broad areas: Organization, Workforce, Budget, 
Requirements, Acquisition, and Industry. 
DAPA’s recommendation for reforming Acquisition focuses on changing the 
DoD’s preferred acquisition strategy for developmental programs from delivering 
100% performance to delivering useful military capability within a constrained period 
of time, no more than 6 years from Milestone A (Department of Defense, 2006, 
January, p. 14).  The intent is to make time a KPP.  Acquisition strategies should be 
formed to streamline acquisition and reduce time to market.  Another DAPA 
recommendation is to change the DoD 5000 series to include Time Certain 
Development (TCD) as the preferred acquisition strategy for major weapon-system 
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TCD enforces evolutionary acquisition by making time the focus of the 
up-front requirement statement.  Capabilities should be upgraded over 
time as technologies mature and operational requirements become 
clearer.  TCD differs from prior attempts at valuing time to market, such 
as evolutionary acquisition and spiral development, in that a maximum 
number of years are mandated, the start and end dates are defined, 
and the driving processes (requirements, budget, source selection, 
etc.) are revamped to support it. (Department of Defense, 2006, 
January, p. 14) 
The DAPA report recognized that even the best item or weapons system is of 
use to the warfighter only if he/she has that item or system in hand.  The current 
acquisition system is good at procuring high-quality products.  What it lacks, 
however, is the means to rapidly acquire those items and get them into the hands of 
the forward operators.  CA provides a methodology to help cut the development time 
of new or modified products and aid the rapid fielding of that product.  Details of the 
first use of the CA process and the details of CA procedures are covered in 
Chapters III and IV respectively.     
D. Summary 
This second chapter discussed current and historical statutory requirements, 
policies, and guidance, as it relates to acquisition procedures and the CA approach.  
It is through this literature review that we established a basic level of understanding 
of the acquisition framework today within the context of streamlined acquisition 
reform initiatives.  Finally, this chapter also attempted to improve the readers’ 
awareness of currently documented policies and procedures as laid out in the DoD 
5000 series, the FAR, the DFARS, the DGARS, and OTA.  In our next chapter, we 
analyze the first use of CA through a case study of the Rapid Identification Friend or 
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III.  Rapid Identification Friend or Foe (RIFF) 
Case Study 
A. Introduction 
This case study discusses the development of the Rapid Identification Friend 
or Foe (RIFF) test kit, which is used by the United States military as a method of 
advanced gunshot-residue (GSR) detection to allow the warfighter to identify enemy 
suspects who have fired a weapon or handled bomb-making materials.  This test kit 
has proven to be extremely useful to military personnel in Iraq when encountering 
enemy insurgents who are dressed in civilian clothing and intermingled among the 
civilian populace in crowded market places and in busy streets.  To help readers 
better understand the RIFF test kit, a brief background regarding its technological 
development is provided below.   
An informal, non-Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-based agreement was 
used (now called coordinative acquisition (CA)) by the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency (DTRA) to develop simplified GSR testing for a military-field version of 
diphenylamine test screening technology.  Such testing has been used since the 
1950s (Grebber & Karabinos, 1952, September).  Various forms of the 
diphenylamine testing are currently used today—such as (LET) Instant Shooter 
Identification (ISID-1TM) test kit by Law Enforcement Technologies, Inc., (see Figure 
3.1), and Blue View test kit by Sirchie Finger Print Laboratories, Inc. (SFL) (see 
Figure 3.2).  These test kits are primarily used by civilian law enforcement agencies 
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Figure 3.1 Instant Shooter Identification Kit ISID-1TM 
(Source:  Law Enforcement Technologies, 2006) 
 
Figure 3.2 Blue View Test Kit 
(Source:  Sirchie Finger Print Laboratories, 2006) 
As stated above, GSR testing based upon diphenylamine reagents is not 
new; it has actually been in use by civilian police for well over 30 years.  Previous 
versions required samples to be sent to laboratories, which often took in excess of a 
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today use chemicals such as sulfuric acid, which helps reduce false positives 
previously seen with use of basic diphenylamine tests.   
In comparison, a test kit, such as the ISID-1TM, allows test results to be 
determined in the field within five minutes.  In the case of the ISID-1TM, LET of 
Colorado Springs, CO, paid Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (a US Department 
of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration-contracted facility, operated by 
Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin company) of Albuquerque, NM, to develop 
the patented technology used in the ISID-1TM.  Both companies had previously 
collaborated on this type of technology.  On November 13, 2001, SNL transferred 
this technology to LET through an exclusive license for commercial production and 
distribution; this license allows LET to commercially produce and market the ISID-
1TM test kit.  SNL contacted LET and asked if they would develop a package test kit 
using this technology and market it.  LET took the SNL technology and developed 
the Instant Shooter Identification Kit (ISID-1).  They later used the technology to 
develop the RIFF kit and the ISID-2 TM.   
LET has an Exclusive License from SNL to use this GSR technology, which 
was recently renewed for another 10 years.  There is a royalty agreement in which 
LET must pay SNL a percent for each ISID and RIFF kit sold commercially, but not 
for government agency and DoD sales.  One interesting point surrounding this case 
is that this particular “government-developed technology transfer to commercial 
industry” was recognized in May 2003 by the Federal Laboratory Consortium for 
Technology Transfer by awarding SNL and LET the 2003 Award for Excellence in 
Technology Transfer. 
B. RIFF Test Kit 
Two versions of the RIFF test kit were developed separately as unique 
militarized versions—of the ISID-1TM by LET and of the Dermal Nitrate Test 
(renamed Blue View in 2004) by SFL—which include military modifications such as 
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in the field and operate with minimal training without giving up the accuracy of the 
original GSR-based kits.  The test kits were shrunk down to the size of a pill bottle by 
LET and a flat foil package by SFL (compared to a shoebox for both larger GSR 
designs) (see Figures 3.3, 3.2, and 3.5).  The RIFF test kit allows the military 
member to detect bomb-making residue on suspected enemy personnel detained in 
hostile areas (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) within minutes, while giving the 
warfighter a detection accuracy of 90-95% and instant presumptive evidence.  Prior 
to this detection kit, the military had difficulty in actually determining friend from foe 
in a hostile urban environment.   
 
Figure 3.3 Law Enforcement Technologies’ RIFF Test Kit 
(Source:  Law Enforcement Technologies, 2006) 
 
Figure 3.4 Sandia National Laboratories Test of RIFF Test Kit 
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Figure 3.5 Gunpowder Particle Collection Pouch (RIFF Test Kit) 
(Source:  Sirchie Finger Print Laboratories, 2006) 
The testing process is quite simple.  For example, using LET’s RIFF test kit, 
the warfighter wipes the suspect’s hand, arm, and face with a woven swab, places 
the swab in the kit’s cap and saturates it with a special liquid reagent.  This reagent 
causes the swab to show blue spots if the test proves positive (see Figure 3.6).  The 
residue can be detected for up to two days after explosive material was handled 
(“Troops get instant aid,” 2003, December 22.)  The test kit also serves as a binary 
test, which allows the military to keep the RIFF test sample for later use in a second 
and more conclusive Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) test in a laboratory.  The 
kit detects TNT, Semtex 1-A, COMP-B, C4, HMX, HNS, propellant from artillery 
shells, and will soon be able to detect potassium perchlorate and potassium chlorate 
(“ISID-1 and RIFF description,” 2006.)     
 
Figure 3.6 Example of RIFF Test Kit Results 
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C. Timeline of RIFF Test Kit Development 
1. Prior Technology Development (DTRA, 2006, June)  
(ISID-1 TM and Blue View Test Kits) 
Early 1980s:  SFL develops and markets the Dermal Nitrate Test 
(renamed Blue View in 2004) technology as its version of 
GSR testing.    
Early 2001:  SNL contacts LET to use its technology to develop a new 
type of Gunshot-residue Detection Kit.    
November 2001: SNL provides LET exclusive rights to develop and market 
the Instant Shooter Identification (ISID-1TM) Kits.  SNL 
retains the sole patent for this process.  Additionally, LET 
agrees to pay royalties for ISID-1TM commercial sales, 
excluding US Government agency and DoD sales.   
2. RIFF Requirements Determination (2 Days: 26-27 March 2003) 
DTRA personnel identify time-critical requirements for field units in Iraq to 
distinguish between covert enemy insurgents and benign civilians, and decide to 
take action to find or develop this capability.  This requirement is determined due to 
embedded media reports and Marine Corps/Army officers’ feedback from the field.   
DTRA Nuclear Technology Division, Dr. Joseph P. Avery, DTRA, begins 
market research for a device to support warfighters in Iraq via internet resources, 
phone calls, and interviews with civil law enforcement agencies.  It is at this point 
that Dr. Avery decides that the sense of urgency surrounding this technology 
development requires a more streamlined acquisition approach using DODD 5000.1, 
Section 4.0, Acquisition Policy, as a springboard for innovation and flexibility.   
3. Concept and Development (25 Days: 28 March – 21 April 2003) 
After Dr. Avery conducts his research, only two vendors are identified as 
being technically capable of producing explosive residue detection devices, LET, of 
Colorado Springs, CO, and SFL, of Youngsville, NC.  Both are asked if they are 
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(COTS) product in support of the war effort.  Both contractors agree to modify 
existing products at no cost to the government.  All of the coordination was 
orchestrated by DTRA—quickly finding a way to support warfighters in the field, 
while at the same time teaming with industry to find viable solutions without utilizing 
government funding or a FAR-based contract.  (Note: The intellectual property rights 
are unclear in this case study; litigation may be pending with respect to the RIFF kits 
developed from ISID-1TM and Blue View GSR technology.  Further information was 
not available at time of publication; however, it appears that both versions stem from 
original technology derived from diphenylamine testing).  
4. Fielding and Testing (22 Days:  22 April – 14 May 2003) 
DTRA approaches the Army 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, to determine interest in this product and willingness to support field-testing 
of the device at no cost to the contractor.  Additionally, the device is given the name 
“Rapid Identification Friend or Foe” by the 7th Special Forces Group at this time. 
Two RIFF prototypes, one from each of the two contractors, are sent to Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, for live-fire field-testing.  Members from Company A, 1st 
Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A) tested both prototypes using a M4 5.56mm 
automatic rifle with a 30-round magazine during normal field training exercises.  Both 
prototypes passed.  This testing was provided to both contractors at no cost, which 
was a motivating factor in their participation. 
According to the government, after completing testing, military members 
made suggestions to the contractors on how to improve their particular versions of 
the RIFF test kit.  Examples of such suggestions included adding better directions 
and labeling on the container, use of larger swabs (in the LET kit), and adding 
protective gloves in the SFL kit to avoid contaminating samples.  Contractors made 
important post-test modifications to their prototype kits based upon warfighter 
feedback gained during the live-fire testing.  This direct input from probable 
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difference of opinion between government and industry regarding actual customer 
feedback received; ultimately contractors did not receive the level of feedback they 
expected). 
New RIFF test kits from LET and SFL were marketed to the Department of 
Defense, military services, SOF forces, and Department of Homeland Security.  LET 
enrolled in the GSA Advantage program (GS-07F-5650P) to market its version of the 
RIFF kit via the GSA schedule.  This greatly simplified the ordering process by the 
various field activities, which may explain why this version has ultimately become the 
government standard today (originally the SFL version was the preferred model by 
users in the field during testing).     
Contractors are ready to begin filling RIFF test kit orders to customers.  Both 
companies begin producing units based on actual orders received from various 
government and civil agencies.  SFL eventually stops receiving orders from the 
government and stops producing the RIFF kit.  Again, because SFL did not decide to 
provide its product via GSA Advantage, it appears that the warfighter used the 
easier-to-obtain version (LET’s RIFF test kit). 
D. Results and Lessons Learned 
The RIFF test kits have allowed the military to quickly identify combatants 
from noncombatants and have given the warfighter an effective tool in fighting 
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This test case of coordinative acquisition 
required only 49 days from conception to fielding, based upon a modification of 
existing technology (ISID-1TM and the Dermal Nitrate Test Kits).  The use of this 
acquisition tool drastically reduced the timeline required for a government-required 
modification to a COTS item acquisitioned with normal FAR-based procedures.   
This case was also successful for the contractors.  For example, LET has 
sold 75,000 units to date, generated $712,500 in sales revenue (each RIFF kit sold 
for approximately $9.50), while the government-estimated cost for modification was 
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actual Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was not used by the 
government/industry team (see Chapter IV for an MOU that would have been 
appropriate for this case, as presented by DTRA).  Due to the extreme urgency of 
the requirement, verbal CA procedures were followed.  However, government 








IR&D Cost Estimate New Revenue Generated
CA Return on Investment Example
 
Figure 3.7 IR&D Cost versus Revenue (75,000 units sold) 
(Source:  Created by authors from data provided by LET) 
Another important note to this case analysis is that of patents and intellectual 
property rights.  Without a clear and concise MOU, disputes can arise from 
ambiguous expectations by both contractor and government personnel, especially if 
more than one vendor is involved in the modification of patented technology.  Today, 
LET is the sole provider of the RIFF test kit technology, given that SFL has dropped 
its product from the market.  By choosing to utilize GSA Advantage, which greatly 
simplified the ordering process by field activities, LET was able to control the 
government market for RIFF test kits.  It is important to note, though, that it is not 
totally clear why SFL chose to self-eliminate its product from the market (we do not 
know if there is any correlation to possible/perceived legal action being considered 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 30- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Finally, we found that LET never received the full test report from Ft. Bragg 
nor was given information about government marketing activities of its product.  
Additionally, LET has not had a good mechanism for receiving customer feedback 
from troops in the field since development of the RIFF test kit.  All of these 
expectations could have been addressed adequately through the use of a MOU, 
which would require that together, government and industry plan roles and 
responsibilities ahead of time. 
E. Summary 
In this chapter, we analyzed the development and deployment of the RIFF 
test kit as a CA case study that was the first product developed using this approach 
in 2003.  We explored the history of gunshot-residue testing and the development of 
the Instant Shooter Identification technology, which is the predecessor to the RIFF 
test kit.  A comprehensive timeline was presented encompassing the entire 
acquisition spectrum from requirements determination to deployment in the field 
supporting RIFF test kit’s primary customer: the warfighters.  Finally, we presented 
results and lessons learned from the RIFF test kit case study, which will be drawn 
upon in Chapter IV when we provide recommendations for CA policy development.  
Additionally, the next chapter provides findings and recommendations drawn from 
our literature review in Chapter II, the case study in this chapter, questionnaires, 
interviews, other research, and our personal experiences.  We also provide results 
taken from government and industry questionnaires and provide circumstances 
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IV. Findings and Recommendations 
A. The Concept:  Coordinative Acquisition (CA) Framework 
CA is an acquisition tool founded on the basic tenant that DoD acquisition 
professionals must utilize all available tools and flexibility provided in current 
guidance and regulations.  This flexibility empowers government acquisition 
professionals to meet warfighter needs rapidly through innovative approaches that 
economically and expeditiously provide needed capabilities to our combat forces.  
The processes for CA detailed below were constructed with valuable input collected 
from applicable reference materials, analysis of the procedures used in the Rapid 
Identification Friend or Foe (RIFF) test kit case and discussion with numerous 
acquisition and legal professionals, both inside and outside the federal government. 
1. Define and Validate Need 
The CA process begins as many other acquisition programs begin, with 
identifying a need for an item.  At this point, the specific item need not be defined, 
rather the capability that item will provide.  The CA validation process is far less 
rigorous than a traditional acquisition as only the general need for the requested 
capability must be confirmed.  Specific numbers of items needed and, more 
importantly, program funding are not required at this time. 
2. Conduct Initial Market Research 
Initial market research is conducted in order to determine if the required 
capability is fulfilled by an existing product.  Market research should include all 
potential sources of supply to include other units, other services, other government 
agencies, and the commercial marketplace.  If an existing product is identified that 
can meet the need, that item can be acquired using the normal program funding and 
contracting processes.  If no existing item is identified, the process continues to the 
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3. Refine Capability and Advertise Need 
Once market research has identified the lack of an existing product that 
provides the required capabilities, two key steps are required.  First, review and 
verify the final capability requirements of the product with the operational users.  The 
purpose of this step is simply to confirm that the original need has not changed, nor 
can it be met by a product found during market research.  Second, advertise the 
need to ensure the maximum number of responses, even though CA does not fall 
under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirement (details of the CA to FAR 
relationship are discussed in Paragraph B), to satisfy the intent of free and open 
competition.  Acquisition professionals should exercise sound business judgment in 
determining the appropriate method of advertisement, taking into consideration the 
urgency of need for the new product.  Possible advertisement methods include 
FedBizOpps, broad agency announcements and trade journals.  The additional time 
required to advertise in printed media should be considered.  However, non-
traditional defense contractors may not check FedBizOpps on a regular basis, if at 
all, and their standard industry media sources may be the only way to reach them.   
After advertising for a reasonable amount of time, talks are held with all 
interested vendors that respond to the announcement.  In order to facilitate the rapid 
processing of the CA, verbal discussions are preferred—with appropriate backup 
documentation created.  An integral part of the discussions must include educating 
the vendor on how the CA process works, with special attention to how it differs from 
the more traditional FAR-based contracting approaches. 
4. Issue Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
After completion of initial talks, all interested parties sign a MOU detailing the 
future responsibilities of both the vendor and the government in the prototype 
development process.  See Appendix A for a sample MOU that would have been 
useful during the RIFF test case for coordinative acquisition (MOU developed from 
initial draft MOU provided by Dr. Joseph Avery of DTRA).  Two critical areas 
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process, the government does not provide funding to the vendor.  All items are 
modified and/or products developed using the internal independent research and 
development funds of the vendor.  If the resultant production items are purchased by 
means of a FAR-based contract, the Independent Research & Development (IR&D) 
funds are considered an allowable cost in accordance with FAR 31.205-18 and 
could potentially be recovered at that time.  In addition, the MOU does not provide 
for, or guarantee any follow-on contracts for production-item purchases.  The MOU 
may contain additional terms agreeable to both parties.  If government testing of the 
prototype item is provided by the government (as in the RIFF test case discussed in 
Chapter III) under the terms of the MOU, such testing should be provided to all 
interested vendors equally to avoid any appearance of favoritism. 
5. Coordinate Program, Testing and Exposure 
Throughout the development process, the government agency shall provide 
program coordination, management, and oversight in accordance with the agreed-to 
terms of the MOU.  Upon completion of the prototype process, the government may 
provide testing, if included as part of the MOU.  To avoid additional costs to the 
government, testing should be provided only if the testing is limited to evaluation 
during an existing exercise or field-training environment.  Feedback, both positive 
and negative, is given to the vendor so the company can take into consideration any 
possible modification to the prototype item.  Caution must be taken to ensure that 
the feedback is for informational purposes only and is not construed as a 
government-directed change.  The vendors must use their own judgment on whether 
or not to incorporate the government feedback, along with their own internal testing 
results, into the final item design.  This is purely an internal business decision based 
upon the relevant facts provided. 
The final step of CA involves the government organization involved with the 
MOU to make the final product availability known, or expose its existence to the rest 
of the DoD.  The extent and methodology of this “marketing” exposure should be 
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respective responsibilities in this part of the CA process.  The government agency 
must ensure that the “marketing” of the product does not take on the appearance of 
an official endorsement of the product.  It is simply making other potential users 
aware of the availability of the item, similar to how units communicate the existence 
of a variety of products today.  In addition, the vendor must decide how it will provide 
the item to the government and its commercial users.  As discussed in Chapter III, 
LET greatly expedited its future government orders for RIFF kits through its use of 
GSA Advantage. 
B. Relationship to Existing Acquisition Policies  
CA does not fall under the authority of the DoD 5000 series because it does 
not meet the definition of an acquisition program.  As explained in Chapter II, in 
order to be considered an acquisition program, the action must be a, “directed, 
funded effort that.…”  Coordinative acquisition does not involve the use of research 
and development, procurement or operations and maintenance funds and, therefore, 
does not fall under the existing acquisition program framework as outlined in the 
5000 series documents.  It does, however, meet the overarching objectives laid out 
in DoDD 5000.1 paragraph 4.3 of: flexibility, responsiveness, innovation, discipline, 
and streamlined and effective management.  DoD Instruction 5000.2 details the 
various phases and steps of the acquisition process from initial requirements 
identification through the entire lifecycle of the item.  CA utilizes the vendors’ existing 
commercial product management system to provide the required capability.  Rather 
than rely on government-unique processes and controls to regulate the development 
process, CA relies upon the market forces of the free commercial marketplace. 
Similar to the DoD 5000 series, the FAR defines an acquisition as, “the 
acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services.…”  The FAR 
further defines a contract as a document, “that obligates the government to an 
expenditure of appropriated funds…”  In addition, by further definition, contracts do 
not cover grants and cooperative agreements.  CA utilizes neither a contract nor 
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the FAR does not directly apply to CA, the objectives of full and open competition, 
fair treatment of suppliers, and business ethics are considered sound business 
practices and are an important part of the CA process. 
The DGARS defines Grants and Cooperative Agreements as legal 
agreements whose principal purpose is to, “transfer a thing of value to the recipient 
to carry out a public purpose.…”  Grants are distinguished from Cooperative 
Agreements by the extent of the involvement between the DoD and the recipient; 
with the former, substantial involvement is not expected, and with the latter, 
substantial involvement is expected.  The purpose of CA is not to transfer a thing of 
value to the recipient, but more simply to help the supplier develop a product that 
most likely will be of future use to the DoD.  Therefore, CA does not fall under the 
policies for Grants or Cooperative Agreements. 
The distinction between CA and Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreements (or Technology Investment Agreements (TIAs)) is more difficult to 
discern.  Under United States Code, Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreements (CRADAs) and TIAs are to be carried out only by service laboratories.  
They involve the exchange of resources of some kind (personnel, services, facilities, 
equipment, intellectual property, or “other resources”) between the laboratory and a 
non-Federal party that is consistent with the mission of the laboratory.  Any 
government organization may accomplish CA, as it does not always include the 
exchange of resources.  Under those circumstances, a case can be made that CA is 
a separate and distinct process from a CRADA.  If the coordinative acquisition MOU 
does include an exchange of resources, and the project is being carried out by a 
service laboratory, then a CRADA may be the more appropriate tool to use. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), on the other 
hand, is authorized under code to utilize “other transaction authority (OTA)” to 
support research projects and seek to involve commercial firms that have 
traditionally not done business with the government.  The military departments can 
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weapon systems proposed to be acquired or developed by the various services.  
Again, the applicability of this authority to the CA process depends on the item being 
developed.  If the item to be developed is a stand-alone object, which is not directly 
related to a weapon system, then CA may be a potentially useful option (See Figure 
4.1 for graphic illustration of the CA relationship to existing DoD acquisition policy). 
 
Figure 4.1 Existing Acquisition Policies 
Note: Coordinative acquisition utilizes principles of the existing policies circled in 
yellow, yet does not fall directly under any one of those categories  
(Chart adapted from DARPA, 2004, February 3). 
C. Questionnaire Results 
As part of our overall research effort, we included the use of two 
questionnaires: one questionnaire for government and one for industry (see 
Appendices B and C, respectively).  The purpose of our questionnaire is to gauge 
the opinions of government and industry professionals as a useful supplement to our 
case study analysis and literature research, helping us to better understand the 
application of CA.  The unique experiences of the various contracting officers, 
program managers, and contractors present distinct perspectives as to the ethical 
and legal considerations, willingness to use, and overall first impressions of this type 
of acquisition tool.  It should be noted that all questionnaires and most interviews 
were anonymous; as a result, no particular reference relating to our results are able 
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the quantitative results of the questionnaire (see Figure 4.2).  Sections D through J 
reflect the actual qualitative responses, combined with information gained through 
project research, literature review, and personal interviews.  Most of our 
questionnaires were completed during the National Contract Management 
Association’s (NCMA) 44th Annual Aerospace and Defense Contract Management 
Conference held in Garden Grove, California, from 27–28 July 2006.  During this 
conference, we were able to discuss CA with 35 individuals representing 
approximately 11.5% of all conference attendees.  Respondents represented large 
and small businesses, both traditional and non-traditional defense contractors, as 
well as a broad spectrum of those within government—from unit-level contracting 
officers to more senior leaders from major commands and higher headquarters.  
Government personnel interviewed had five questions to answer, while industry 
members were asked six questions ranging from whether or not they had heard 
about coordinative acquisition all the way to consideration of its use in the future.  In 
addition to the questionnaires collected during the NCMA conference, we also 
collected additional questionnaires from a variety of government and industry 
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Coordinative Acquisition Demographic and Quantitative Responses on Questionnaires: 
Demographics :
Total Conference Attendees 304 %
Government Responses 11 3.6%
Contractor Responses 24 7.9%
Total: 35 11.5%
Government Questionnaire Q1 Q2 Q5
(1, 2, 5) Heard of CA? If No, would you use? Losing Intellectual property?
Yes 9%
No 91%
1-3 No 9.1% 45.5%
4 Maybe 54.5% 27.3%
5-7 Yes 36.4% 27.3%
TOTAL % 100.0% 100.0%
Contractor Questionnaire Q1 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6














Avg Low Item Value $822,827





Avg Low R&D Value $1,846,666.67




5-7 High 45.0%  
Figure 4.2 Questionnaire Quantitative Results 
There were varied responses from the questionnaires collected.  For 
example, one response from industry as a whole was that 30% of those questioned 
had heard of CA, whereas only 9% from government knew anything about it (see 
Figure 4.3).  One explanation could be that industry leaders do a better job at 
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slower in adjusting to these changes.  In addition, while government leadership may 
pursue new approaches that are more effective to contracting and acquisition, they 
are often slowly implemented because of delays in waiting for detailed direction and 
policy from higher command levels.   
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Government
Contractor
Previous Knowledge of CA
Aware of CA Not Aware of CA
 
Figure 4.3 Contractor versus Government Knowledge of CA 
Another response from those questioned revealed 75% of industry respondents 
were willing to use CA, even though it meant accepting risk and no guarantees from 
future purchases from government, while only 36% of government respondents were 
willing to try coordinative acquisition (see Figure 4.4).  One plausible explanation for 
this difference in opinion is that government employees tend to be more rules-
oriented (keepers of public policy) and are not willing to venture into gray, uncharted 
areas until public policy is provided by their chain of command.  Yet, many 
contractors are more flexible and are empowered to make changes faster and to try 
new methods for achieving higher returns on investment.  Accountability tends to be 
more rigid for government workers (as they must follow strict statutory requirements 
and other regulations such as the FAR and DFARS) as compared to their contractor 
counterparts who must only answer to their board of directors.  Ultimately, 
contractors are accountable to their shareholders, whereas government employees 
are accountable to Congress and the US taxpayer.  This line of accountability places 
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guidance.  Thus, unless an ethical violation or a lack of profitability occurs, 
contractors have more maneuverability regarding changes in processes and 
acceptance of new acquisition methods than do government personnel. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Government
Contractor
Would You Now Use CA?
Yes Maybe No
 
Figure 4.4 Willingness to Use CA in the Future  
(Note:  Contractor questionnaire only included yes or no response options) 
Another industry response was the desire to use CA to modify mature 
technologies more than developing new technologies, by a rate of 45% to 25% 
respectively.  Industry was more willing to modify existing commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) items rather than to develop immature technologies, which places more 
technology risk on vendors.  However, when asked which items best fit coordinative 
acquisition, 45% of industry stated that new technology was best; other responses 
clustered around commercial, non-developmental, and multiple-use items.  Industry 
respondents also preferred the government to fund research and development 
projects more often than not; specifically, 10% of industry respondents are willing to 
fund R&D internally, whereas 39% believe it should be funded by government.   
Overall, industry respondents were more willing than government to use 
coordinative acquisition as a viable acquisition tool, especially when compared to 
other methods such as CRADAs, OTAs, or FAR-based contracts.  The biggest 
advantage to using coordinative acquisition (from industry’s perspective) is the ease 
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industry respondents interviewed felt this was merely a business decision; and if a 
strong business case is made, they would consider developing an existing or new 
technology using internal company funds.  Government respondents, on the other 
hand, tended to take a “wait and see” approach, waiting for higher headquarters’ 
policy to provide direction and sanctions for use.  Conversely, other government 
respondents saw coordinative acquisition as problematic regarding transparency, 
competition, and fairness/reasonableness.  Finally, government legal personnel 
interviewed believe the first legal challenge by a contractor will be difficult to win on 
part of the government due to the government’s commitment in helping to develop a 
product (several anonymous respondents).   
D. Why Government is Hesitant to use CA 
During our research and analysis gained from our questionnaires and 
personal interviews, we discovered that government program managers, contracting 
officers, and lawyers are hesitant to use coordinative acquisition almost solely 
because they are not sure about the legal or ethical aspects and ramifications of 
use.  Government workers believe they do not have the authority to use CA without 
specific guidance from their higher headquarters.  From the perspective of several 
legal professionals interviewed, there are two overarching issues driving government 
hesitancy toward coordinative acquisition.  The first is the appearance of use of 
appropriated dollars in developing a product through the CA process and second, 
meeting the expectations of the contractor (Britt & Gunderson, 2006, September 8).  
These two issues usher in a much broader set of sub-issues and may help explain 
why contractors are actually more willing to use coordinative acquisition than are 
their government counterparts.  One contractor we spoke with actually stated that 
they needed government to be brave and use this tool as an alternative to FAR-
based contracts.   
It is important to note that the first legal concern (use of appropriated funds) 
arises because while appropriated dollars, as used in traditional FAR contracts, are 
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government resources are used to coordinate the MOU and participate in the 
product development, testing, and marketing.  It is possible that some personnel 
could construe this use of government property as an indirect expenditure of 
appropriated dollars.  A civilian firm can write these items off as the cost of doing 
business; however, the government must be able to track activities to provide for 
transparency (checks-and-balances) and oversight.  The second legal concern, 
meeting the expectations of the contractor, brings to light a number of issues for 
government employees.  These include equitable estoppel, fair competition, 
appearance of conflict of interests (government and contractor relationship), and 
most importantly, intellectually property rights.  Regarding equitable estoppel, one 
legal definition defines it as follows: “A type of estoppel that bars a person from 
adopting a position in court that contradicts his or her past statements or actions 
when that contradictory stance would be unfair to another person who relied on the 
original position” (Nolo, 2006).  Some government legal advisors worry that if a 
contractor can prove reliance on the government, the government could be held 
liable under CA and would be in jeopardy of violating the Anti-deficiency Act. 
Intellectual property rights are also a concern of government personnel.  Our 
case study of the RIFF test kit in Chapter III touches on a pending dispute between 
Sandia National Laboratories and Sirchie Finger Pint Laboratories, Inc., over the 
basic technology used in the Instant Shooter Identification test kit used to develop 
the field version: the RIFF test kit.  The government must be sure of and clarify 
intellectual property rights when dealing with modification of existing items/COTS 
technology when new technology is provided to the contractor by the government. 
There are also ethical issues relating to coordinative acquisition that concern 
government professionals.  These issues include placing contractors at an unfair 
economic disadvantage (especially small businesses), perceived favoritism, unfair 
business practices, and most importantly, expectations on part of the contractors.  
Throughout our research, we were reminded of the use of the “wink-wink” 
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promises to contractors regarding future contracts “off the record.”  The definition of 
“wink” per Wikipedia is a form of semi-formal communication, which indicates 
shared, unspoken knowledge (Wikipedia, 2006).  In this scenario, the contractors 
take risks they normally would not have made under the guise that the government 
will come through and eventually award a contract.  This behavior is clearly illegal 
under both the Anti-deficiency Act and the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 
because: 1) conceivably, the government could be held accountable for “unofficial” 
commitments before authorized Congressional appropriations, and 2) this scenario 
lacks competition.    
According to government representatives questioned, the use of a clear and 
well-defined MOU noting roles and responsibilities will help to alleviate most 
government concerns, although there are still lingering aspects of this acquisition 
tool which trouble government lawyers.  Interpretation is ultimately the most 
important aspect of accepting or rejecting coordinative acquisition.  One interesting 
offshoot of CA is the notion of using a third-party (non-profit) organization to act as 
an intermediary for government and industry to come together and share technology 
and developmental information and more easily form partnerships for rapidly 
developing new concepts and technologies.   
E. Advantages of Coordinative Acquisition 
We draw upon government and industry questionnaires and interviews, 
literature review, and project research in suggesting that CA is an innovative concept 
that provides the following advantages: 
1.  Expedited research and development, production, and fielding of new and 
improved technologies.   
Coordinative acquisition provides urgently needed support directly to our 
nation’s warfighters, therefore, ultimately supporting National Security Strategy.  As 
new, urgently needed requirements are identified from the battle zones across the 
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and develop existing COTS and immature technologies in order to meet the end-
needs of our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen.  Our research indicates that 
75% of contractors questioned are willing to support warfighters who are in harm’s 
way, even if it means decreased profit margins.  This “patriot factor” is a common 
thread among all contractors we interviewed.  The use of CA involves locating and 
sharing critical information and integrating key personnel (both government and 
industry) for the common good of our warfighters. 
2.  Easier for non-traditional defense vendors to conduct business with 
government.  
One of the reasons why coordinative acquisition was so appealing to 
contractors is that they saw an opportunity to coordinate with the government on 
needed technologies without wading through FAR-based contracting requirements.  
One contractor stated that his/her CRADA with the government took over a year to 
approve due to painful legal reviews; he/she would very much consider using an 
MOU and spend this time and effort on developing the new/improved technology or 
product rather than on “administrivia.”  Many commercial contractors also stated 
they do not care for doing business with the government precisely for that reason.  
Coordinative acquisition may offer these non-traditional vendors an opportunity to 
work with the government on future projects.   
3.  Provides government with more flexibility, responsiveness, and innovation 
in developing new capabilities.   
As noted in Chapter II, this approach supports critical aspects of guidance 
provided via DoDD 5000.1, namely flexibility, responsiveness, innovation, discipline, 
and streamlined effort and effective management.  As seen throughout the 
government views above, some of these concepts are open to interpretation; 
however, there is little dispute that coordinative acquisition meets most of these 
objectives.  As seen in the RIFF test kit case study in Chapter III, it took industry 49 
days to modify existing gunshot-residue technology into a viable military version that 
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the administration lead-time could have caused award and execution of this product 
to take much longer and could have cost the government more than it actually did 
under the coordinative acquisition method.  The end-result is a more streamlined 
effort than the other acquisition methods mentioned in Chapter II, and one that is 
directly in-line with DoD Directive 5000.1. 
F. Other Areas of Concern with CA  
Any time contractors spend private funds to develop a product they hope to 
market to the government, they are accepting a level of risk.  Without a contract, 
there is no guarantee that the government will eventually purchase the item; in 
addition, there may be no commercial market for the item.  This very process played 
out two decades ago for Northrop Corporation and the F-20 Tigershark fighter 
aircraft program.  The F-20 program was unique to major weapon system programs 
at the time because it was privately funded.  Northrop and its subcontractors 
covered all of the program costs (Martin & Schmidt, 1987, June).  The first F-20 
rolled out only 32 months after the program began (a full month ahead of schedule) 
and met all technical goals set for initial testing—a mark rarely hit, if ever, by 
government-funded programs.  For various reasons (including changes in US export 
policy and increased competition from the F-16 Fighting Falcon), the market for the 
F-20 never materialized.  Northrop was consequently forced to cancel the program 
in December 1986 after spending nearly $1.2 billion dollars of its private funds.  
Northrop wrote off the F-20 program costs quarterly, so in spite of the large losses, 
the company was still able to remain profitable (Martin & Schmidt, 1987, June).  The 
magnitude of the loss, however, provides a warning to all of the inherent risks 
associated with independently funded research and development. 
Through discussions with government and contractor acquisition and legal 
personnel, several common themes arose surrounding the CA process.  First, while 
the CA methodology does not directly violate any existing policies or regulations that 
we know of, it does provide significant occasion for the appearance of improprieties.  
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open procedures without the regulatory protections provided in a traditional FAR-
based contract arrangement.  Second, without proper application of ethical 
principles, coordinative acquisition can be abused.  A specific concern raised by 
several professionals interviewed was that the government, through its assistance in 
the development process, would create a sole-source environment for future 
purchases.  Approximately half of the contractors questioned were concerned about 
developing the product at their own expense and then having the government utilize 
information gained during the CA process to purchase the item from another vendor.  
The majority of government professionals interviewed were troubled by the lack of 
transparency and checks-and-balances in the process.   
Additional ethical considerations raised include perceived favoritism and 
unfair business practices, lack of clear expectations for both the vendor and the 
government, and the potential to put small business at a disadvantage by requiring 
private funding of development costs.  An important note to our questionnaire results 
is that at the time of the interviews, the detailed CA framework had not yet been 
developed; approximately half of those responding were being exposed to CA for the 
first time. 
G. Suggested Circumstances for Use 
Clearly, coordinative acquisition is not the end-all for all acquisition actions.  
Conversely, its use should only be used within a narrow framework of conditions.  
We offer the following key circumstances for use, based upon analysis of 
government and contracting questionnaires and interviews, literature review, and our 
own experience in contracting and logistics, as an enhancement to any policy 
discussion relating to coordinative acquisition.  
A primary reason for using coordinative acquisition is to make available for 
DoD and military personnel urgently needed products or services that cannot wait 
for normal FAR-based contracting or cannot be procured in a timely fashion utilizing 
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urgent need for miniaturized, hardened, accurate, and simplified gunshot-residue 
detection kits by military members fighting the Global War on Terrorism (Avery, 
2006, May-June).  This was an example where the urgency of need drove the type 
of acquisition tool used.  Obviously, routine and mature technology buys, which are 
easily attainable on the open market, would not warrant coordinative acquisition use.  
Other considerations for use of coordinative acquisition are the types of 
product or service required and the maturity of the technology.  While coordinative 
acquisition could conceivably be used as a start for future weapon-system 
development, it is most ideally suited for COTS modification and collaboration or the 
development of immature technologies (e.g., 40% of developed technology).  The 
deciding factor for the vendors on the developmental stage is very dependent upon 
how much technology risk they are willing to incur.  The decision is also contingent 
on the urgency of government need, and how long acquisition personnel are able to 
wait for results.  One positive note is that the increase in COTS use by the military, 
since the elimination of the MILSPEC requirement, lends itself to coordinative 
acquisition use and greater non-traditional defense contractor participation in 
government contracts.   
Coordinative acquisition should also be used only after alternative acquisition 
methods have been reviewed, such as those previously mentioned.  The primary 
consideration of this review must be government resources (namely time and cost) 
associated with each alternative use.  The urgency of need will ultimately drive the 
alternative used, whether it is a FAR-based or other, non-traditional agreement.   
Finally, as coordinative acquisition becomes more widely used and accepted, 
more instances of complex technology development may be considered.  As users 
better understand policy and institutional risks within the legal and ethical framework 
of coordinative acquisition use, more governmental agencies and industry 
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H. Encouraging Contractors to Use 
As noted above, 75% of contractors were readily willing to accept the 
opportunity to use CA in their companies.  While some traditional defense 
contractors balked at the prospect of funding R&D out of their own budget, others 
said it was the cost of doing business in today’s business environment.  The 
following recommendations are presented—as a result of our analysis of 
questionnaires and interviews and project research—to help government better 
understand contractors’ tolerance for risk and desire to participate in CA. 
1.  Communicate requirements.   
The government must take the time to fully understand user requirements and 
the intended use of products and services.  If the user is included in requirements-
determination development, there will be less ambiguity on the part of the contractor 
as to what is actually required to deliver a production-ready prototype to the 
customer.  Often, changes in requirements or misinformation on intended uses can 
lead to wasted resources (time/money) and can lead to spiraling developmental 
costs on part of the contractor—which ultimately affects the customer.   
2.  Help build a business case.   
The government should provide support in order to help the contractor build a 
business case to determine return on investment (ROI).  By sharing good 
information on cost-benefit analysis and a possible future-requirements 
determination, the contractor can more easily make a coordinative acquisition go/no-
go decision.  Again, this coordinative activity can help both parties determine 
feasibility for use in an expedited manner, which is one of the main advantages of 
using coordinative acquisition.  However, the government must make no assurances 
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3.  Clarify intellectual property rights.  
It is imperative for the government to be clear regarding intellectually property 
rights in the MOU and exactly how those rights will be determined.  Many 
contractors were concerned about possible government behavior in the event 
government finds an additional vendor who has the required technology after the 
original company has already spent its own money developing the technology.  
Issues regarding government-provided technology must also be addressed.  Finally, 
there needs to be assurances given regarding marketing exposure and other 
support on part of the government in the MOU.   
4.  Well-defined MOU.   
Most of the contractors we spoke with made it quite clear that any MOU used 
would need to spell out concise roles and responsibilities.  In the RIFF test kit case, 
although only a verbal agreement was used, the vendors were asked to develop a 
deployment-ready prototype by a certain date; the government was requested to 
market these prototypes and help set up a GSA Advantage Schedule.   
5.  Show simplicity of method.   
The government should assure contractors that use of coordinative 
acquisition is to their advantage (e.g., cost-benefit analysis supporting a strong 
business case).  However, government personnel must also show how this 
acquisition tool compares to other methods (FAR and Non-FAR-based contracting 
vehicles).  By knowing the benefits and simplicity of using CA, the contractor should 
be more willing to attempt use based on the urgency of need, maturity of technology, 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 50- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
I. The Way Ahead for Government Agencies 
As noted from questionnaire analysis, only 36% of respondents indicated they 
would use coordinative acquisition, while 54% were neutral to the idea, and 9% said 
“no” outright.  The main reason given for not wanting to use coordinative acquisition 
as an alternative acquisition tool is that respondents believe they are not authorized 
to use it, since policy has yet to be provided or even sanctioned by their higher 
headquarters or chain of command (as of this writing).  Most of those surveyed took 
a “wait and see” approach, while more were willing to use CA than not.  The 
following recommendations are provided to government, based on the analysis of 
our literature review, questionnaires, and interviews, and from the practical 
application of our professional experiences, in order to encourage its acquisition 
workforce to consider utilizing coordinative acquisition as a viable acquisition tool.   
1.  Develop clear policy.   
Government program managers and contracting officers require DoD policy to 
pave the way for future use.  We have attempted to conduct a thorough examination 
of this acquisition tool and to offer recommendations on its use and implementation.  
Senior acquisition leaders in the DoD must examine the literature further and make 
solid policy and guidance determination for coordinative acquisition use.  We firmly 
believe that coordinative acquisition indeed does have a place in the contracting 
officer’s toolbox, but only with careful analysis and understanding of the ROEs for its 
use.  As stated before, coordinative acquisition is not relevant to all procurements 
and should only be used once other alternatives have been ruled out.  Once clear 
policy is distributed to military services, major commands, and higher headquarters, 
government workers will be more able to utilize CA for the ultimate benefit of the 
warfighter—who depends upon streamlined and expedited acquisition to implement 
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2.  Train acquisition personnel on appropriate use.   
Once clear and concise policy and guidance is developed and distributed 
down to the various commands, we recommend the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) develop training to ensure proper analysis and determination is conducted 
before, during, and after the use of CA.  The formal framework for coordinative 
acquisition use must be developed and added to DAU contracting and acquisition 
courses, where appropriate.  Appropriate training will decrease the chance of abuse.   
3.  Consider other alternatives for government/industry collaboration.   
There are also alternatives to direct government implementation of 
coordinative acquisition.  One alternative previously mentioned in this report is an 
on-line, third–party, non-profit organization, which can act as an intermediary 
between government and industry, assisting both parties in coming together for 
coordination and collaboration. 
J. Recommended Policy for Future Application 
As a follow-on to the circumstances for use above, the following basic 
elements are provided as recommendations for future DoD policy on CA based upon 
government and industry interviews and our literature review from Chapter II.   
1.  Official definition:  
Recommended official definition for coordinative acquisition for DoDD 5000.1 
is provided below: 
“Coordinative Acquisition” is the non-FAR process of making available for 
purchase required goods and services without the use of appropriated funds 
through execution of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between a 
government agency and vendor(s), using “Free and Open Competition” 
principles, administrative, coordinative and team management techniques, 
and accepted contractor internal business practices, accounting and business 
systems, and decision-making and risk assessment processes.  No 
government commitment or promise of future government contracts shall be 
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2.  Urgency of need drives use:   
CA is most applicable to urgent needs that cannot be met through more 
traditional acquisition methods.  Routine buys of mature technology would not be 
appropriate for CA use.   
3.  Type of products/services:   
Recommend use in support of modified COTS, non-developmental items, 
developmental technologies, or a combination of one or more such products.   
4. Memorandum of Understanding:   
Recommend using a MOU between government and vendor(s).  Roles and 
responsibilities should be clearly defined for each party. 
5.  Ensure open competition:   
Recommend thorough initial market research to ensure open competition 
before use of coordinative acquisition.  Additionally, we recommend written 
justification for any use of, “other than full and open competition.” 
6.  Consider other acquisition methods.   
Recommend reviewing all FAR and non-FAR based contracting options 
before using coordinative acquisition (e.g., OTA, CRADA, and grant) and use the 
most appropriate method for the scenario. 
7.  Reasons for use memo:   
Recommend program manager create a written memorandum listing reasons 
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8.  Prevent unauthorized government commitments.   
Recommend that all program personnel receive training outlining that the 
government cannot make commitments or promises for future government contracts 
or financial support during the coordinative acquisition process. 
9.  Share marketing efforts and customer feedback.   
Recommend provisions are included in the MOU, which ensure vendors 
receive information relating to government marketing of their product(s) and results 
of field tests if conducted.    
10.  Use Agency Ombudsman:   
A disputes resolution mechanism is required to resolve CA issues.  
Recommend adding a third party agency ombudsman to offer an official means to 
resolve disputes and disagreements between government and industry.   
K. Summary 
Chapter IV provided findings and recommendations for coordinative 
acquisition use based upon several sources including our literature review drawn 
from Chapter II, the case study from Chapter III, questionnaires, interviews, other 
research, and our own collective personal experiences.  Specifically, we addressed 
the actual CA concept using an in-depth framework which explained all of the steps 
in the CA process, including a sample MOU we provided as a recommended tool for 
scenarios such as the RIFF test case used in Chapter III.  We also discussed CA’s 
relationship to existing acquisition policies and provided our findings on industry and 
government attitudes toward CA, including ways to encourage contractors to use the 
process more in the future.  Also included in this chapter were results from 
questionnaires taken by government and industry professionals, which contributed to 
understanding the advantages and concerns relating to CA use from legal, ethical, 
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DoD policy and provide a way ahead for government use in the future.  In our next 
and final chapter, we provide conclusions and an overall summary to the CA project 
and introduce three additional areas requiring further research relating to 
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V. Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 
A. Coordinative Acquisition (CA) Conclusions 
CA, like any acquisition methodology, has positive and negative 
considerations.  Proper ethical conduct, legal consideration, and sound business 
judgment are all core competencies required for successful implementation of CA.  If 
not conducted appropriately, CA may lead to the appearance of improprieties in 
government acquisition.  CA should be considered simply another acquisition tool 
(distinct from Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and 
“other transaction authority”) available to government acquisition professionals, 
especially in times of urgent and compelling needs, in direct support of the 
warfighter.   
The landscape of federal contracting and acquisition is changing—as 
evidenced by recent continued calls for acquisition reform, specifically the Defense 
Acquisition Performance Assessment recommendations calling for a more 
streamlined acquisition architecture.  As noted in this report, important issues 
relating to CA include how this approach is viewed by government and industry 
personnel, the legal and ethical considerations as it relates to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)/Defense FAR Supplement, DoD 5000 series, and 
other acquisition policies, and, finally, the circumstances under which industry will 
accept this form of acquisition for future DoD projects. 
Additionally, in order to remain successful in today’s competitive global 
environment, the government must work more closely with its suppliers.  The old 
mentality of “it is us versus them” must be shed and shifted to a focus on partnering 
and long-term relationships—not only with the current, large, defense-systems 
contractors, but also with the small business provider.  Another consideration is the 
shift away from military specifications towards commercial-off-the-shelf items.  
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that include increased commercial transactions; the government may no longer be 
their largest customer.  As we see the defense industrial base continue to 
consolidate and change its business models, we need to attract additional non-
traditional defense contractors to participate in product development.  Furthermore, 
speed is a critical element in supporting the warfighter against an enemy who 
constantly evolves its strategy and tactics.  We must find a way to develop and field 
new technology faster in order to remain the best military force in the world. 
CA is a viable option if utilized in the proper circumstances and with the 
proper discipline.  No acquisition process is immune from abuse or can be 
completely protected from unethical participants.  Current FAR-based research and 
development contracts also place a level of risk on contractors—they might 
anticipate a significant follow-on production contract that may never materialize.  
Yet, entrepreneurial firms that may be deciding whether to develop a new 
technology may be enticed by the prospect of receiving direct customer feedback on 
a prototype and a potential increased production market beyond the civil sector. 
B. Areas Requiring Further Research 
We have attempted to explore all segments relating to CA with respect to 
existing DoD policy with a focus on the RIFF test case; however, we recognize that 
not all areas relevant to CA use were adequately covered.  Based on our research 
we believe there are three areas that require further research in order to advance 
the understanding of the implications of CA use across the DoD.   
1.  Non-profit Organization Use:   
The potential application of an enhanced version of coordinative acquisition 
for use with non-profit organizations (e.g., Non-Governmental Organizations 
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2.   Expand Advertising of CA:   
The advertising of requirements is an important step in coordinative 
acquisition; as such, more research is required to determine best practices for initial 
notices targeting non-traditional defense contractors. 
3.  Using Services:   
An exploration of CA applicability to services is required, especially given the 
fact that services now make up over 60% of contracts.     
C. Project Summary 
Chapter I introduced the concept of coordinative acquisition, discussed the 
current acquisition environment and provided a broad background of DoD 
acquisition reform efforts.  A problem identification section presented the concept of 
coordinative acquisition as originally presented by the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency.  Finally, the chapter presented an overview of each of the project’s five 
chapters in order to introduce the reader to CA project concepts as it relates to the 
broader acquisition framework. 
Chapter II discussed current and historical statutory requirements, policies, 
and guidance as they relate to acquisition procedures and the coordinative 
acquisition approach.  It is through this literature review that we established a basic 
level of understanding of the acquisition framework today within the context of 
streamlined acquisition reform initiatives.  Finally, the chapter also attempted to 
improve the reader’s understanding of currently documented policies and 
procedures as laid out in the DoD 5000 series, the FAR, the DFAR and the Defense 
Grant and Agreement Regulatory Systems. 
Chapter III analyzed the development and deployment of the RIFF test kit as 
a CA case study, which was the first product developed using this approach in 2003.  
We explored the history of gunshot-residue testing and the development of the 
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Identification Friend or Foe (RIFF) test kit.  A comprehensive timeline was presented 
encompassing the entire acquisition spectrum from requirements determination to 
deployment in the field supporting RIFF test kit’s primary customer: the warfighters.  
Finally, results and lessons learned were presented from the RIFF test kit case 
study, which was drawn upon in Chapter IV when we provided recommendations for 
CA policy development. 
Chapter IV provided findings and recommendations of CA use based upon 
several sources including our literature review drawn from Chapter II, the case study 
from Chapter III, questionnaires, interviews, other research, and our own collective 
personal experiences.  Specifically, we addressed the actual CA concept using an 
in-depth framework that explained all of the steps in the CA process, including a 
sample Memorandum of Understanding we provided as a recommended tool for 
scenarios such as the RIFF test case used in Chapter III.  We also discussed CA’s 
relationship to existing acquisition policies and provided our findings on industry and 
government attitudes toward CA, including ways to encourage contractors to use the 
method more in the future.  Also included in the chapter were results from 
questionnaires completed by government and industry professionals, which 
contributed to understanding the advantages and concerns relating to CA use from 
legal, ethical, and sound business standpoints.  Finally, we provided 
recommendations on possible DoD policy and introduced a pathway for government 
use in the future.   
Finally, Chapter V drew in all concepts presented in the previous four 
chapters and summarized the project as a whole.  We concluded by providing three 
areas requiring further research which will ensure continued discussion and study of 
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Appendix A. Memorandum of Understanding 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE 
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY 
AND THE 
US ARMY 7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP 
AND 
SUPREME TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
FOR 
DEVELOPMENT, PROTOTYPING AND TEST OF THE RAPID 
IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE TEST KIT 
1.  PURPOSE: 
 This memorandum of understanding (MOU) documents a 
cooperative and collaborative relationship between the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA), US Army 7th Special Forces Group, and 
Supreme Technologies, Inc. (STI) for the rapid development, 
prototyping, test, and government notification of the Rapid 
Identification Friend or Foe (RIFF) test kit designed to detect 
gunpowder and explosive residue on enemy suspects.  This project is 
in response to immediate combat field requirements in Iraq for a 
method of quickly identifying covert enemy insurgents from peaceful 
civilians.  The RIFF kit will be a modified or militarized version of 
Supreme Technologies’ commercial-off-the-shelf Shooter Identification 
Kit (SIK). 
2.  AUTHORITY: 
DoD Directive 5105.62, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 
November 28, 2005. 
3.  SCOPE: 
 This MOU is intended to establish a framework for a cooperative 
relationship between DTRA, US Army 7th Special Forces Group, and 
Supreme Technologies, Inc., for the development, prototyping, test, 
government notification and possible fielding of the Rapid Identification 
Friend or Foe (RIFF) Test Kit.    
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 During the US invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, feedback from 
combat units stated the need to discern between covert enemy 
insurgents and benign civilians.  Most enemy insurgents are not 
dressed in military uniforms, but are wearing civilian clothing.  An 
instant requirement arose to provide an inexpensive and portable 
individual tool to detect explosives and gunshot residue, and, thereby, 
assist American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in quickly distinguishing 
between peaceful civilians and hostile covert enemy insurgents.  After 
initial market research, it was discovered that civilian law enforcement 
agencies were using a commercial-off-the-shelf portable gunshot-
residue test kit to test criminal suspects for evidence of discharging 
firearms.  However, the civilian kit was too large, expensive, and 
unable to survive the rigors of a military environment.  This MOU is an 
agreement between the aforementioned parties to miniaturize, militarily 
harden, simplify, and reduce the cost of the civilian version of the 
gunshot-residue kit, resulting in a modified version of the COTS 
product named the Rapid Identification Friend or Foe (RIFF) test kit.     
5.  MUTUAL AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS: 
 a. WHEREAS, all parties to this MOU hereby certify that 
they possess and are willing to commit the resources necessary to 
honor and complete the provisions of this MOU.    
           b. WHEREAS, all parties to this MOU have agreed to 
expedite all work and activities covered under this MOU in order to 
develop a producible and field-ready capability as quickly as possible 
to support our combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This is a 
rapid response coordinative acquisition effort.  
 c. WHEREAS, DTRA will serve as the primary coordinator 
and program manager over the collaborative effort to develop, test, 
prototype, and notify government of the new RIFF test kit.  DTRA will 
be responsible for notifying appropriate DoD agencies, military 
services, and relevant federal agencies of the availability of the 
production ready and procurable version of the RIFF kit, and will 
forward procurement information and instructions to such 
organizations.  All DTRA services will be provided at no cost to support 
this effort.     
 d. WHEREAS, The US Army 7th Special Forces Group 
(SFG) will be responsible for performing, at no cost to any party to this 
agreement, operational field-testing of the prototype RIFF kits provided 
by Supreme Technologies, Inc.  Such operational field-testing can 
occur during the normal course of Special Operations training.  The 
SFG will be responsible for recording the test results and writing a test 
report of the performance of the prototype test kits, including any 
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report must state whether or not the prototype RIFF kits are currently 
acceptable for combat field use.  The SFG will transmit the completed 
test report to the DTRA RIFF Project Manager.  
 e. WHEREAS, Supreme Technologies, Inc. is responsible 
for modifying their commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Shooter 
Identification Kits for military use.  The new product will be labeled the 
“Rapid Identification Friend or Foe” or “RIFF Kit.”  STI will attempt to 
miniaturize, simplify, harden to survive a military environment, and 
reduce the cost of the current COTS product.  STI will forward ten (10) 
prototype samples of the RIFF Kit to the US Army 7th Special Forces 
Group, to the attention of MSG Kevin Smith, Company A, 1st Battalion, 
7th Special Forces Group (A), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28310.  STI 
has agreed to expedite this project and proceed with all deliberate 
speed to complete a prototype in the quickest possible time.  Once an 
agreed upon production ready configuration of the RIFF kit is 
determined, STI will be responsible for expedited production and 
response to any military, DoD, or Federal Agency orders placed for 
RIFF Kits.   
6.  FUNDING, REIMBURSEMENT, AND CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS: 
 a. WHEREAS, each Party to this MOU will be responsible 
for their own costs associated with any development, test, effort, task, 
or activities required to support and execute the provisions of this 
MOU.  This MOU contains no funding or reimbursement requirements 
between the parties. 
 b. WHEREAS, this memorandum is not intended to and 
does not create any contractual rights or obligations with respect to the 
signatory agencies, organizations or any other parties.  
 c. WHEREAS, The government does not promise or 
guarantee future contracts, orders, or work in connection with this 
agreement. 
7. CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
 Conflicts that cannot be resolved at working levels will be 
referred through each Party’s chain of command/supervision for 
resolution. 
8. THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS: 
 Nothing in the MOU, express or implied, is intended to confer 
any rights, remedies, claims, or interests upon a person not a party 
hereto. 
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Each party to this MOU will retain a copy of this document and any 
subsequent changes for a period consistent with internal document 
handling procedures. 
10.    CHANGES, REVIEWS, AND REVISIONS: 
 a. Any Party to this MOU may request a review of this 
document at any time.  Changes in conditions or missions may require 
substantial revisions or development of a new MOU. 
 b. Revisions to this agreement must be approved by all 
Parties in writing prior to implementation. 
 11.   INFORMATION RELEASE AND CONFIDENTIALITY: 
a. All parties shall keep confidential and protect from unauthorized 
use and disclosure all: confidential, proprietary, and/or trade secret 
information; and tangible items containing, conveying, or embodying 
such information. 
b. Any proprietary, sensitive, or confidential information, data, or 
processes owned or operated by the Parties of this agreement shall 
not be disclosed to Parties outside this MOU.   
 c. The terms of this agreement, including information 
pertaining to or generated under the provisions of this MOU, will not be 
disclosed to Parties outside this MOU, except as may be required 
under federal law. 
 d. Any Press Releases or information concerning this MOU 
or work performed under this MOU must be reviewed and approved by 
the Parties to this agreement prior to release.  Government agencies 
must have any release reviewed and approved through their Public 
Affairs Office.     
12. LIABILITIES: 
 The provisions of this Paragraph shall survive the performance, 
completion, termination, or cancellation of this MOU.  The obligation to 
protect Proprietary Information and liability for unauthorized disclosure 
or use of Proprietary Information does not apply with respect to such 
information which: 
 a. is lawfully published or is otherwise lawfully in the public 
domain at the time of disclosure; or 
 b. is lawfully known to the receiving party prior to disclosure; 
or 
 c.  is disclosed with the prior written approval of Supreme 
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 d. is independently developed by the receiving party without 
use of such Proprietary Information; or 
 e. is lawfully known or available to the receiving party for 
use without restriction from a third party; or 
 f. becomes part of the public domain without improper 
means, or without breach of this MOU by the receiving party; or 
 g. is disclosed as required by judicial action after all 
available legal remedies to maintain the Proprietary Information in 
secret have been exhausted.   
 
13. EXPORT CONTROL 
 Information exchanged under this Agreement may be subject to 
United States export control laws and regulations under the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778).  Each party is responsible for 
complying with all applicable United States export control laws and 
regulations for information subject to the export control laws and 
regulations. 
14. EFFECTIVE DATE AND TERMINATION: 
 a. This MOU is effective as of the date of the last signature 
below. 
 b. This MOU will terminate after a period of 24 months.    
 c. Any Party may terminate this MOU after mutual 
consultation or by the unilateral action of one Party.   
 
________________________                    _________________________________ 
DTRA Signatory                                          Supreme Technology Signatory 
Date:________________                Date: _____________ 
___________________________ 
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 Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
 Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
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 Marine Corps Systems Command 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
5. Steve Britt 
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 Vienna, Virginia  
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 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
7. Dr. Rene Rendon 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
8. Dr. Keith Snider 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
9. James Greene 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
10. Michelle Bourke  
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